Track

Status

Governing provision

No limitation where the victim was a child — § 8(1)(B): a prosecution may be commenced at any time for, “[i]f the victim had not attained the age of 18 years at the time of the crime, a prosecution for incest; unlawful sexual contact; sexual abuse of a minor; rape or gross sexual assault, formerly denominated as gross sexual misconduct; unlawful sexual touching; or sexual exploitation of a minor.” § 8(1)(A) does the same for murder and criminal homicide in the first or second degree. 

BUT twenty years for sex trafficking — § 8(2-A): “A prosecution for a Class A, Class B or Class C crime involving unlawful sexual contact or gross sexual assault or a prosecution for a Class A or Class B crime involving aggravated sex trafficking must be commenced within 20 years after it is committed.” Aggravated sex trafficking does not appear in the § 8(1)(B) list, so a child victim of aggravated sex trafficking is on a twenty-year clock running from the offense, not from majority and not without limit. 

The general periods — § 8(2): except as provided in subsection 1 or 2-A, a prosecution for a Class A, Class B or Class C crime must be commenced within six years and for a Class D or Class E crime within three years. 

Tolling — § 8(3): the periods do not run while the accused is absent from the State (capped at five additional years), while a prosecution for the same crime based on the same conduct is pending in Maine, or while a corresponding juvenile proceeding is pending. § 8(4): where a timely charge is dismissed for error or defect, a new prosecution may be commenced within six months or during the next session of the grand jury, whichever is later. 

An unusual saving provision — § 8(7): the limitations defense does not bar conviction of a lesser included crime for which the period has expired, provided the period has not expired (or there is none) for the crime charged and the evidence would sustain a conviction for the crime charged. 

Why this has been changed to “partly removed”: the § 8(1)(B) list is strong — six offenses, unlimited, whenever the victim was under eighteen. But it is a list, and § 8(2-A) shows on the face of the statute that at least one serious child sexual offense sits outside it. Aggravated sex trafficking of a child expires twenty years after the act. The tracker’s “No deadline” cannot be right while the same section expressly gives a twenty-year period to a Class A crime involving the sexual exploitation of a child.

17-A M.R.S. § 8 — Maine Legislature, official Maine Revised Statutes

On its face, no limitation — § 752-C(1): “Actions based upon sexual acts toward minors may be commenced at any time.” That has been the text since P.L. 1999, ch. 639, § 1, effective 11 August 2000. 

What conduct qualifies — § 752-C(2), as rewritten in 2023, lists gross sexual assault (17-A § 253), sexual abuse of a minor (§ 254), unlawful sexual contact (§ 255-A), unlawful sexual touching (§ 260), sexual exploitation of a minor (§ 282) and incest (§ 556). The two paragraphs that previously defined the conduct by reference to 17-A § 251(1)(C) and (D) were repealed by the same Act. 

The reach-back that failed — § 752-C(3): “This section applies to all actions based upon sexual acts toward minors regardless of the date of the sexual act and regardless of whether the statute of limitations on such actions expired prior to the effective date of this subsection.” Added by P.L. 2021, ch. 301, § 1, effective 18 October 2021. This subsection is unconstitutional as applied to already-expired claims — see section 3. 

The history that makes the classification, taken from the Law Court’s own account in Dupuis — from at least 1954 until 1985 the general limitations period for most civil claims was six years. In 1985 the Legislature enacted a separate six-year period for claims based on sexual acts toward minors. That was extended to twelve years in 1991, and the period was eliminated altogether in 2000. Critically, “both the 1991 extension and the 2000 elimination of the statutory period under section 752-C applied only to claims accruing after their effective date or those ‘not yet … barred by the previous statute of limitations in force’ on that date.” 

Why this has been changed to “partly removed”: subsection (1) removes the deadline, but only forward. A survivor whose six-year period had already run before 11 August 2000 was never covered by the elimination, and the 2021 attempt to reach those survivors has been held unconstitutional. That is precisely the structure the tracker already scores as “Partly removed” in Colorado, where § 13-80-103.7(1)(b) does the same thing with a 2022 date, and it is the same point raised on the Illinois page in this review. Three states now turn on the same convention; it should be settled once rather than state by state.

14 M.R.S. § 752-C — Maine Legislature, official Maine Revised Statutes

What the Legislature was trying to do — the bill (L.D. 589, 130th Legislature) was introduced, in its sponsor’s words as recorded in the dissent, “to provide justice for people who may not have [had] a voice for themselves at the time of their abuse” because they “were too scared, young or otherwise inhibited from coming forward to report their abusers” in time. It passed and was signed, taking effect 18 October 2021. 

What the Law Court held — “We accept the report and hold that the retroactive application of section 752-C(3) contravenes centuries of our precedent and multiple provisions of the Maine Declaration of Rights as well as the Constitution’s provisions regarding separation of powers.” And in the conclusion: “Not all retroactive legislation is prohibited, but retroactive legislation cannot impair vested rights. Once a statute of limitations has expired for a claim, a right to be free of that claim has vested, and the claim cannot be revived. For the reasons given above, section 752-C(3) is unconstitutional as applied to expired claims.” 

The Court was explicit that it was not deciding a policy question — “There can be no doubt that we have gained a new understanding of the effect of trauma and the delays that it can cause in the ability of a victim to pursue a cause of action. Such evolved knowledge provides support for the elimination of any statute of limitations for torts involving sexual assaults. But the issue here is not the propriety of the elimination of a statute of limitations but rather the revival of a claim after the relevant existing statute of limitations has expired.” 

It rejected both routes other states use — the Court declined to follow Campbell v. Holt’s right–remedy distinction, holding that it “ignores reality”, and declined the post-Campbell balancing approach, holding that vested rights “are not subject to destruction, however compelling the reason for destroying the right” and that a balancing test is “amorphous, inconsistent, unworkable, and could potentially trample constitutionally protected rights based on transient majority inclination or the view of an individual judge.” 

It was 5–2 — majority: Stanfill, C.J., Mead, Horton and Connors, JJ., and Humphrey, A.R.J. Dissent: Douglas and Lawrence, JJ. The dissent would have upheld the statute, reasoning that Maine’s Constitution contains no express anti-retroactivity provision (unlike New Hampshire’s, which the framers had before them and did not copy), that the majority’s supporting authorities are dicta, that Maine’s article I, sections 1 and 6 derive from the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and Massachusetts has upheld exactly this kind of revival in Sliney v. Previte, and that the correct test is the three-part due process test from State v. L.V.I. Group, which § 752-C(3) satisfies. 

The Court counted the national split — no fewer than fifteen jurisdictions permit revival of expired claims; ten hold it impliedly prohibited. The dissent puts the majority of courts on the permissive side; the majority, counting jurisdictions with express anti-retroactivity clauses, puts the majority on the prohibitive side. Both agree there is no clear modern trend. 

Two things follow for the tracker. First, Maine’s revival is “none” because of a court decision, not legislative inaction — the same distinction already recorded for Colorado, Kentucky and Utah. Second, and worth noting internally: CHILD USA appeared as amicus curiae in Dupuis, through Marci A. Hamilton, alongside the Maine Coalition Against Sexual Assault and Pine Tree Legal Assistance. The American Tort Reform Association and the American Property Casualty Insurance Association appeared on the other side. None of that is recorded in the tracker.

14 M.R.S. § 752-C — Maine Legislature, official Maine Revised Statutes (subsection (3) is the provision held unconstitutional)

the tracker carries “Maine | Dupuis v. RC Bishop of Portland | 2025 ME 6 | 2025 | Held §752-C(3) retroactivity unconstitutional as applied to already-expired claims. Revival scored as none.” That is accurate.