Track

Status

Governing provision

No limitation for the core offenses — § 29-110(11): “There shall not be any time limitations for prosecution or punishment for treason, murder, arson, forgery, sexual assault in the first or second degree under section 28-319 or 28-320, sexual assault of a child in the second or third degree under section 28-320.01, incest under section 28-703, sexual assault of a child in the first degree under section 28-319.01, labor trafficking of a minor or sex trafficking of a minor under subsection (1) of section 28-831, or an offense under section 28-1805; nor shall there be any time limitations for prosecution or punishment for sexual assault in the third degree under section 28-320 when the victim is under sixteen years of age at the time of the offense.” 

BUT SEVEN YEARS for a second group — § 29-110(3): “no person shall be prosecuted for kidnapping under section 28-313, false imprisonment under section 28-314 or 28-315, child abuse under section 28-707, pandering under section 28-802, debauching a minor under section 28-805, or an offense under section 28-813 when the victim is under sixteen years of age at the time of the offense (a) unless the indictment for such offense is found by a grand jury within seven years next after the offense has been committed or within seven years next after the victim’s sixteenth birthday, whichever is later”, or a complaint is filed within the same period and a warrant issued. The practical deadline is the survivor’s twenty-third birthday. 

AND SEVEN YEARS for a third group — § 29-110(5): the same seven-year structure, measured from the offense or from the victim’s EIGHTEENTH birthday whichever is later, applies to “an offense under section 28-1803 or 28-1804”. § 29-110(4) applies it to violations of § 28-831(2) or (3) — the trafficking offenses that are not the subsection (1) minor offenses named in subsection (11). 

Eighteen months for one more — § 29-110(10): an offense under § 28-717 must be prosecuted within one year and six months after commission or after the child reaches the age of majority, whichever is later. 

The general periods — § 29-110(1): three years for any felony. § 29-110(2): one year and six months for any misdemeanor or other indictable offense below the grade of felony. 

Fleeing and prior proceedings — § 29-110(13): the limitations do not extend to any person fleeing from justice. § 29-110(15): time during which a quashed, set aside or reversed proceeding was pending is not reckoned. 

A long series of applicability clauses — § 29-110(16) to (21) each provide that changes made by a particular Act “shall apply to offenses committed prior to [the effective date] for which the statute of limitations has not expired as of such date and to offenses committed on or after such date.” Six separate amendments between 2004 and 2019 carry that same formula. Nebraska has therefore extended forward repeatedly and never reached back. 

Why the status is “partly removed”: the subsection (11) list is strong, but §§ 29-110(3) and (5) put a seven-year clock on child abuse under § 28-707, debauching a minor under § 28-805, and the offenses under §§ 28-813, 28-1803 and 28-1804. Those are child-protective offenses with real deadlines — age twenty-three for the subsection (3) group, twenty-five for the subsection (5) group.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-110 — Nebraska Legislature, official statute text

No limitation against the abuser — § 25-228(1)(a): “There shall not be any time limitation for an action against the individual or individuals directly causing an injury or injuries suffered by a plaintiff when the plaintiff was a victim of a violation of section 28-319.01 or 28-320.01 if such violation occurred (i) on or after August 24, 2017, or (ii) prior to August 24, 2017, if such action was not previously time barred.” 

TWELVE YEARS PAST TWENTY-ONE against everyone else — § 25-228(1)(b): “An action against any person or entity other than the individual directly causing an injury or injuries suffered by a plaintiff when the plaintiff was a victim of a violation of section 28-319.01 or 28-320.01 may only be brought within twelve years after the plaintiff’s twenty-first birthday.” The deadline against an institution is therefore the survivor’s thirty-third birthday. 

No conviction required — § 25-228(2): “Criminal prosecution of a defendant under section 28-319.01 or 28-320.01 is not required to maintain a civil action for violation of such sections.” 

Which offenses — the section reaches only violations of § 28-319.01 (sexual assault of a child in the first degree) and § 28-320.01 (sexual assault of a child in the second or third degree). Abuse that would constitute some other offense is outside § 25-228 entirely and runs on Nebraska’s general limitation provisions. 

Why “partly removed” is right, and it is right for two reasons rather than one. First, the elimination in subsection (1)(a) applies only where the abuse occurred on or after 24 August 2017, or earlier if the claim was not already time barred — a prospective elimination of the kind this review has scored as partial in Colorado, Illinois and Maine. Second, and unusually, the elimination stops at the abuser: institutions get a fixed cap at thirty-three however late the survivor comes forward. Very few states in this dataset draw the line by defendant in that way.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-228 — Nebraska Legislature, official statute text

The statutory limit — § 25-228(1)(a) applies to violations occurring “prior to August 24, 2017, if such action was not previously time barred.” A claim already barred is outside the section by its own terms. 

And the Supreme Court has confirmed it — the annotation printed by the Nebraska Legislature beneath § 25-228 reads: “This section does not apply to an action that was already barred under the existing statutes of limitations at the time this section was enacted in 2012. Doe v. McCoy, 297 Neb. 321, 899 N.W.2d 899 (2017).” 

Doe v. McCoy, 297 Neb. 321, 899 N.W.2d 899 (2017) explains that § 25-228 does not apply to actions that were already time-barred before the section was passed. It is cited on the strength of the Legislature’s own annotation, printed with the section; the decision itself was not retrieved, and nothing is stated from it beyond that annotation. 

The criminal side has the same habit — §§ 29-110(16) through (21) each confine an amendment to offenses “for which the statute of limitations has not expired” on the relevant date. There is also Nebraska authority on the point: the annotations to § 29-110 record State v. Hirsch, 1 Neb. App. 1120, 510 N.W.2d 534 (1993) — “While the Legislature has the power to enact retroactive changes in a statute of limitations, it cannot remove a bar or limitation which has already become complete” — and State v. Wiemer, 3 Neb. App. 821, 533 N.W.2d 122 (1995), applying that to first degree sexual assault. 

Nebraska therefore sits on the restrictive side of the vested-rights split, but by a route worth distinguishing: the limit is written into the statutes themselves and confirmed by the courts, rather than imposed by a court striking down a legislature’s attempt. No Nebraska window has ever been enacted and struck; none has been enacted at all.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-228 — Nebraska Legislature, official statute text (the Doe v. McCoy annotation is printed with the section)

no Nebraska row.