Track

Status

Governing provision

The child rule — § 29-04-03.1(1): “Except as provided in subsection 2, a prosecution for a violation of sections 12.1-20-03 through 12.1-20-08 or of section 12.1-20-11 if the victim was under eighteen years of age at the time the offense was committed must be commenced in the proper court within twenty-one years after the commission of the offense or, if the victim failed to report the offense within this limitation period, within three years after the offense was reported to law enforcement authorities.” 

Note that the twenty-one years runs from the act, not from the survivor’s eighteenth birthday. A child abused at six is inside the ordinary period only until twenty-seven. The second limb is what saves the late-disclosing survivor: if the offense was not reported within the twenty-one years, the State has three years from the date it is reported to law enforcement — with no outer cap on when the report may be made. 

The DNA and fingerprint route — § 29-04-03.1(2): “If, based upon evidence containing deoxyribonucleic acid or a fingerprint obtained at the time of offense, a suspect is conclusively identified by deoxyribonucleic acid testing after the time period prescribed in subsection 1 has expired, a prosecution may be commenced within three years after the suspect is conclusively identified by the deoxyribonucleic acid testing or fingerprint authentication.” 

Seven years for the wider felony class — § 29-04-02.1: “Except as otherwise provided by law, a prosecution for a felony violation of chapter 12.1-20 or for the crime of human trafficking must be commenced in the proper court within seven years after the commission of the offense.” Chapter 12.1-20 is the sex offenses chapter. Section 29-04-03.1 is the “otherwise provided by law” that displaces it for the named sections where the victim was a child. 

Which offenses get twenty-one years, and which get seven. Sections 12.1-20-03 through 12.1-20-08 and 12.1-20-11 get the twenty-one-year rule, but only where the victim was under eighteen. Every other felony under chapter 12.1-20 — and any of those sections where the victim was an adult — runs on the seven-year period in § 29-04-02.1. 

The reporting limb is the feature worth carrying: the three-years-from-report rule in § 29-04-03.1(1) gives North Dakota an uncapped route that most states retaining a criminal deadline do not have, and it operates in exactly the delayed-disclosure cases the tracker exists to describe.

N.D. Cent. Code ch. 29-04 (Limitations) — North Dakota Legislative Branch, official Century Code text

The rule — § 28-01-25.1(1): “Notwithstanding section 28-01-25, a claim for relief resulting from childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within twenty-one years after the potential claim resulting from alleged childhood sexual abuse accrued.” 

Minority tolling is displaced. The opening words “Notwithstanding section 28-01-25” switch off the general disability provision, which would otherwise stop the clock during the survivor’s minority. The twenty-one years therefore runs from accrual, not from eighteen. 

A floor for the youngest children — § 28-01-25.1(2): “If the plaintiff was under fifteen years of age when the act resulting in a potential claim for childhood sexual abuse occurred, the applicable twenty-one-year period of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff has reached fifteen years of age.” A child abused at four therefore has until thirty-six; a child abused at seventeen has until thirty-eight. 

What counts as childhood sexual abuse — § 28-01-25.1(3): “any act committed by the defendant against the plaintiff which occurred when the plaintiff was under eighteen years of age and which would have been a violation of chapter 12.1-20 or 12.1-27.2.” Chapter 12.1-27.2 is the sexual performances by children chapter. 

No need to isolate the act — § 28-01-25.1(4): “In a claim for relief under this section, the plaintiff is not required to establish which act in a continuous series of sexual abuse acts by the defendant caused the injury.” This is an evidential provision, not a limitation one, but it is unusual in this dataset and worth recording. 

Adults get nine years — § 28-01-25.2: “A claim for relief that resulted from sexual assault, sexual abuse, gross sexual imposition, or any other claim based on a sexual act or sexual contact as defined in chapter 12.1-20 must be commenced within nine years after the date of the act.” 

Claims against the State track the same periods — § 28-01-22.1(3): notwithstanding the ordinary three-year period for actions against the State, a claim resulting from sexual assault, sexual abuse, gross sexual imposition or any other claim based on a sexual act or sexual contact as defined in chapter 12.1-20 must be commenced “(a) Within nine years after the date the act occurred; or (b) Within twenty-one years after the date the act occurred, if the act occurred when the plaintiff was under eighteen years of age.” Subsection (4) applies the same under-fifteen floor.

N.D. Cent. Code ch. 28-01 (Time for Commencing Actions) — North Dakota Legislative Branch, official Century Code text

Chapter 28-01 was read in full — all forty-eight sections, §§ 28-01-01 to 28-01-48 — and contains no revival provision for sexual abuse claims. Sections 28-01-25.1 and 28-01-25.2 both set periods running forward from the act and neither addresses claims already barred. 

The chapter does contain one revival provision, and it is instructive by contrast. Section 28-01-47(2), the asbestos limitation, provides: “Any such action which would otherwise be barred before August 1, 1997, as a result of expiration of the applicable period of limitation, is revived or extended.” The North Dakota legislature has therefore used the language of revival when it meant to, in a different field, and has not used it for childhood sexual abuse. 

No North Dakota appellate decision on the constitutionality of retroactive revival was located, and none is asserted. Because no window has ever been enacted, the question that produced Thompson v. Killary, Mitchell v. Roberts, Aurora Public Schools v. A.S., Dupuis, Ball, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Doe and McKinney v. Goins has not arisen in this state.

N.D. Cent. Code ch. 28-01 — North Dakota Legislative Branch, official Century Code text (§ 28-01-47(2) shows the contrast)