In 2021, the Maine State Legislature passed a landmark law creating a permanent revival window for previously expired child sex abuse (CSA), child sexual abuse material (CSAM), and trafficking claims. This law removed procedural barriers that had long prevented survivors from seeking justice against their abusers and those who enabled them—regardless of when the abuse occurred.
Almost immediately, the Catholic Church—which has long perpetrated and concealed the sexual abuse of children in Maine—challenged the law, arguing it violated the state constitution’s due process clause. In November 2023, the Maine Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Dupuis v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, a case of first impression on the constitutionality of revival laws for expired statutes of limitations (SOLs).
For months, survivors, advocates, and legal experts anticipated the Court’s ruling, expecting it to affirm the legislature’s authority to revive CSA claims to remedy the injustice of restrictive SOLs for victims of these crimes. Yet, in a stunning and deeply disappointing 5-2 decision, the Court declared Maine’s revival window unconstitutional, slamming the courthouse doors shut on survivors who had finally been given a path to justice.
This ruling is a fundamental failure of legal reasoning, a rejection of modern constitutional principles, and a devastating blow to survivors and the broader fight for SOL reform.
A Decision Based on Outdated Legal Doctrines
At the heart of the Court’s flawed decision is its reliance on the antiquated theory of “vested rights” retroactivity that has long been abandoned in modern jurisprudence. This doctrine has historically enabled powerful institutions to evade accountability by arguing that once an SOL expires, defendants acquire a permanent right to be free from liability—even in cases of child sexual abuse.
But this is not how modern constitutional law views SOLs. The U.S. Supreme Court settled this issue more than a century ago in Campbell v. Holt (1885), explicitly rejecting the idea that a defendant has a vested right in a limitations defense. The Court held that SOLs are procedural, not substantive rights—meaning legislatures have full authority to extend, amend, or eliminate them when justice demands it.
The Maine Supreme Court itself had previously acknowledged this principle, recognizing that SOLs are laws of process, affecting remedies—not vested rights. See, e.g., Lamberton v. Grant, 94 Me. 508, 518; Lunt v. Stevens, 24 Me. 534, 537; Mason v. Walker, 14 Me. 163, 166. Revival laws do not impose new liabilities—they merely restore access to justice for survivors whose claims were unjustly time-barred. As Justice Douglas’ dissent reiterates, there is no vested right to do wrong.
Moreover, the Court has never clearly established a constitutional prohibition on retroactive laws. At times, it has suggested that such laws are unconstitutional only if they “impair vested rights or impose new liabilities”—without citing any clear constitutional basis. See Merrill v. Eastland Woolen Mills, Inc., 430 A.2d at 560 n.7.
Modern jurists recognize that retroactive laws must be evaluated based on legislative intent, their predicted effects, and whether they serve a legitimate policy goal that cannot be attained through non-retroactive alternatives—not on outdated assumptions about “vested rights.” The Maine Legislature’s intent was clear: to provide long-overdue access to justice for survivors who, through no fault of their own, were unable to come forward before the expiration of the limitations period on their claims.
A Departure from the National Movement
One of the most troubling aspects of this decision is that the Maine Supreme Court was not required to reach this conclusion. Unlike some states that have explicit anti-retroactivity clauses, Maine’s Constitution contains no such restriction on retroactive civil legislation. Without a constitutional prohibition, the Court’s ruling was purely discretionary—not legally mandated.
The vast majority of courts—including in states with far more restrictive constitutional language—have upheld revival laws. And courts across the country, including in Louisiana, New York, and New Jersey have consistently ruled that legislatures have broad authority to remedy past injustices—particularly in CSA cases. These courts have acknowledged that science, public policy, and fundamental fairness overwhelmingly support allowing survivors to file claims when they are ready.
But the majority dismisses the overwhelming national precedent as “unpersuasive”—without making any meaningful effort to distinguish why. Its decision defies modern principles of legislative deference and is out of step with the national trend.
Shielding Perpetrators and Enablers at Survivors’ Expense
At its core, the Maine Supreme Court’s decision prioritizes the interests of perpetrators and complicit institutions over the rights of the victims they harmed.
The majority claims that revival laws unfairly burden defendants by requiring them to litigate old claims, but this argument collapses under scrutiny. Revival laws do not lower the standard of proof—civil cases still require evidence, due process, and judicial scrutiny; and survivors are not wrongfully accusing people simply because time has passed—revival laws remove arbitrary procedural barriers that previously blocked legitimate claims.
The reality—well-documented by researchers, trauma specialists, and legal scholars—is that CSA victims often require decades to come forward. Many do not recognize or fully process their abuse until their 40s, 50s, or beyond. This is not a matter of delay or forgetfulness but a psychological and neurobiological response to trauma.
The idea that it is “unfair” to require perpetrators and institutions to answer for credible claims of child sexual abuse is not a legal argument—it is an excuse for shielding wrongdoers.
The majority’s reasoning fails to account for who the defendants in these cases actually are. We are not talking about small, powerless individuals caught up in technical legal disputes. The primary defendants in CSA cases often include serial predators, powerful institutions, and abusers who have maintained their positions of trust and influence for decades. Many of these entities had full knowledge of the abuse and actively worked to suppress claims, silence victims, and protect
abusers from facing justice. These institutions should be the first to answer for their failures, yet the Maine Supreme Court has now ensured that many of them never will.
As the dissent rightly pointed out, the majority’s reasoning effectively grants perpetrators and enabling institutions an absolute constitutional right to be free from liability based solely on the passage of time—regardless of the circumstances, the merits of the case, or other constitutional guarantees.
By blocking revival, the Court is sending a dangerous message: if abusers and their enablers can evade detection long enough, the legal system will ultimately protect them—not their victims.
As other courts and legislatures continue to uphold and expand access to justice, Maine’s ruling will ultimately be seen as a historical misstep.