Track

Status

Governing provision

No limitation where the victim was a child — § 45-1-205(1)(c): “A prosecution for an offense under 45-5-502, 45-5-503, 45-5-504, 45-5-507, 45-5-508, 45-5-625, 45-5-627, 45-5-702, 45-5-705, 45-5-706, or 45-5-711 may be commenced at any time if the victim was less than 18 years of age at the time that the offense occurred.” 

That list is identical to the civil definition — § 27-2-216(2) defines “childhood sexual abuse” by reference to the same eleven sections. Montana therefore uses one list of offenses for both tracks, which is unusual in this dataset and worth noting: it means the criminal and civil entries cannot drift apart by definition, which is precisely how Minnesota’s two tracks came apart in this review. 

Ten years where the victim was an adult — § 45-1-205(1)(b): except as provided in (1)(c) or (9), a prosecution for a felony offense under §§ 45-5-502, 45-5-503, 45-5-504, 45-5-507(4) or (5), 45-5-625 or 45-5-627 may be commenced within ten years. 

The general periods — § 45-1-205(2)(a): five years for a felony. § 45-1-205(2)(b): one year for a misdemeanor. § 45-1-205(1)(a): deliberate, mitigated or negligent homicide, at any time. 

A DNA route — § 45-1-205(9): “If a suspect is conclusively identified by DNA testing after a time period prescribed in subsection (1)(b) has expired, a prosecution may be commenced within 1 year after the suspect is conclusively identified by DNA testing.” 

When time starts — § 45-1-205(7)(a): an offense is committed either when every element occurs or, where the offense is based on a continuing course of conduct, when the course of conduct is terminated; time starts to run the day after.

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1-205 — Montana Code Annotated, official MCA

Against the abuser — § 27-2-216(1): except as provided in subsection (4), an action based on intentional conduct for damages from childhood sexual abuse against the individual who committed the acts must be commenced “(a) before the victim of the act of childhood sexual abuse that is alleged to have caused the injury reaches 27 years of age; or (b) not later than 3 years after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury was caused by the act of childhood sexual abuse.” 

Against an institution, on identical terms — § 27-2-216(3): except as provided in subsection (5), in an action against “any entity that owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by an employee, officer, director, official, volunteer, representative, or agent of the entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff”, the same two periods apply. 

What counts — § 27-2-216(2): “childhood sexual abuse” means any act committed against a plaintiff who was less than eighteen at the time and that would have been a violation of §§ 45-5-502, 45-5-503, 45-5-504, 45-5-507, 45-5-508, 45-5-625, 45-5-627, 45-5-702, 45-5-705, 45-5-706, 45-5-711, “or prior similar laws in effect at the time the act occurred.” 

And the general saving provision applies — § 27-2-216(7): “The provisions of 27-2-401 apply to this section.” 

Age twenty-seven is a short floor by the standards of this review — shorter than Michigan’s twenty-eight, Kansas’s thirty-one, Missouri’s thirty-one, Massachusetts’s fifty-three. What partly offsets it is that Montana gives institutional defendants the same period as the abuser, with no gross-negligence uplift and no shorter clock. Only Massachusetts does the same among the states reviewed so far.

Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-216 — Montana Code Annotated, official MCA

FIRST LIMB — against the abuser, and only with an admission or conviction — § 27-2-216(4): “A claim for damages described in subsection (1) that would otherwise be barred because the applicable statute of limitations has expired may be commenced within 1 year of May 7, 2019, if the individual who committed the act of childhood sexual abuse against the plaintiff is alive at the time the action proceeds or is commenced and: (a) has admitted to the commission of the act of childhood sexual abuse against the plaintiff in either a written and signed statement or a statement recorded by audio or video; or (b)(i) has made one or more statements admitting to the commission of the act of childhood sexual abuse against the plaintiff under oath or in a plea agreement; or (ii) has been convicted of an offense listed in subsection (2) in which the plaintiff was the victim.” Note the further condition that the abuser be alive. 

SECOND LIMB — against an institution, on a knowledge test — § 27-2-216(5)(a): a claim under subsection (3) that would otherwise be barred “must be revived if the court concludes that the entity against whom the action is commenced, based upon documents or admissions by employees, officers, directors, officials, volunteers, representatives, or agents of the entity, knew, had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, officer, director, official, volunteer, representative, or agent and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent future acts of unlawful sexual conduct.” § 27-2-216(5)(b): such an action “may be commenced within 1 year of May 7, 2019.” 

And “admissions” is defined broadly — § 27-2-216(6): admissions include a criminal conviction of an employee or agent for an offense of childhood sexual abuse; a written statement; a documented or recorded oral statement; or statements made in a plea agreement or change of plea hearing, at a trial, or “in a settlement agreement.” 

The inclusion of settlement agreements is the sharpest drafting choice in the section. Institutional knowledge of abuse most often surfaces in settlements, and settlements are ordinarily confidential. Montana made a settlement agreement an “admission” capable of reviving an otherwise dead claim against the institution. 

Bilbruck v. Valley County, No. CV-21-40-GF-BMM (D. Mont., 26 June 2024) is understood to have upheld the retroactive clause. It is not in the source folder and was not retrieved; nothing is stated from it here. NOT VERIFIED. 

This is a window rather than a bare retroactive clause, and it is scored as one: it has an opening date, a closing date and its own conditions, all inside subsections (4) and (5). That distinguishes Montana from Connecticut and Massachusetts, where the legislature lengthened the period itself and the retroactivity rode along with it. The tracker already records Montana as “window closed”, which is right; what it lacked was the dates and the fact that there were two limbs on different tests.

Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-216 — Montana Code Annotated, official MCA (subsections (4) to (6) are the window)

no Montana row.