Track

Status

Governing provision

No limitation for felonies, but the rule is judge-made, not statutory. North Carolina has never enacted a felony limitation period. State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 167 S.E.2d 274 (1969): “In this State no statute of limitations bars the prosecution of a felony.” The court went on to say that the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial is therefore the only meaningful limit on delay in a felony prosecution. 

BUT MISDEMEANORS HAVE A DEADLINE, AND SOME OF THEM ARE SEXUAL OFFENSES — § 15-1(a): “The crimes of deceit and malicious mischief, and the crime of petit larceny where the value of the property does not exceed five dollars ($5.00), and all misdemeanors except malicious misdemeanors, shall be charged within two years after the commission of the same, and not afterwards…” 

Ten years for a listed group — § 15-1(b): “Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the following misdemeanors shall be charged within 10 years of the commission of the crime: (1) G.S. 7B-301(b). (2) G.S. 14-27.33. (3) G.S. 14-202.2. (4) G.S. 14-318.2. (5) G.S. 14-318.6.” Of those, G.S. 14-27.33 is sexual battery, G.S. 14-202.2 is indecent liberties between children, G.S. 7B-301(b) is failure to report child abuse, and G.S. 14-318.2 and 14-318.6 are child abuse and failure to report a crime against a juvenile. 

The 2019 Act created that ten-year rule. S.L. 2019-245, § 2(a) added subsection (b); before it, every one of those offenses ran on the ordinary two-year misdemeanor period. 

The saving clause — § 15-1(a): “Provided, that if any pleading shall be defective, so that no judgment can be given thereon, another prosecution may be instituted for the same offense, within one year after the first shall have been abandoned by the State.” 

Why this has been changed to “partly removed”: the elimination is real, but it is confined to felonies, and it comes from case law rather than from § 15-1. Section 15-1 is the section the tracker cites, and § 15-1 does the opposite of eliminating — it sets a two-year period for misdemeanors generally and a ten-year period for five named offenses, three of which are sexual or child-protective. Sexual battery under G.S. 14-27.33 is a Class A1 misdemeanor and is charged in childhood cases; it carries a hard ten-year deadline from the act, with no tolling for the survivor’s minority on the face of the section.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-1 — North Carolina General Assembly, official statute text 

State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 167 S.E.2d 274 (1969) — full opinion, free 

The child rule — § 1-17(d): “Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a), (b), (c), and (e) of this section, a plaintiff may file a civil action against a defendant for claims related to sexual abuse suffered while the plaintiff was under 18 years of age until the plaintiff attains 28 years of age.” The deadline is the survivor’s twenty-eighth birthday. 

The conviction rule — § 1-17(e): “Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) of this section, a plaintiff may file a civil action within two years of the date of a criminal conviction for a related felony sexual offense against a defendant for claims related to sexual abuse suffered while the plaintiff was under 18 years of age.” This has no outer age cap: a conviction obtained when the survivor is fifty starts two fresh years. 

The two subsections are alternatives, and each is expressly “notwithstanding” the other. A survivor over twenty-eight is out under (d) but may still be in under (e) if there is a felony conviction. 

What it replaced — before 1 December 2019, childhood sexual abuse claims ran on the general three-year tort period in G.S. 1-52, with the clock starting on the survivor’s eighteenth birthday under G.S. 1-17(a). The deadline was therefore twenty-one. McKinney, ¶ 3 of the background, records exactly that. 

Effective date and reach — S.L. 2019-245, § 9(c): “Part IV of this act becomes effective December 1, 2019, and applies to civil actions commenced on or after that date.” Section 4.2(a) amended G.S. 1-52 to carry an express exception “as provided by G.S. 1-17(d) and (e)”. 

Twenty-eight is at the short end of this dataset. The conviction limb in § 1-17(e) is the distinguishing feature: it is the route by which a North Carolina survivor in her forties can still sue.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-17 — North Carolina General Assembly, official statute text 

S.L. 2019-245 (SAFE Child Act) — North Carolina General Assembly, enacted session law

The window — S.L. 2019-245, § 4.2(b): “Effective from January 1, 2020, until December 31, 2021, this section revives any civil action for child sexual abuse otherwise time-barred under G.S. 1-52 as it existed immediately before the enactment of this act.” Two years exactly and closed. 

It was upheld. McKinney v. Goins, 387 N.C. 35, 911 S.E.2d 1 (2025), held that § 4.2(b) does not violate the Law of the Land Clause (N.C. Const. art. I, § 19). The reasoning: “the revival of an otherwise expired statute of limitations merely affects a statutory defense — a mode of procedure. It does not implicate a vested right.” 

The court’s ground was that a limitations defense is not property. Relying on Hinton v. Hinton, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 410 (1868), Oats v. Darden, 5 N.C. 500 (1810) and Trustees of the University of North Carolina v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58 (1805), the court held that statutes of limitations are “clearly procedural, affecting only the remedy directly and not the right to recover” and so fall outside the vested rights doctrine altogether. 

It also read the state Ex Post Facto Clause as confirming the result. N.C. Const. art. I, § 16 prohibits only retroactive criminal laws and retroactive tax laws; applying the expressio unius canon, the court inferred that other retroactive civil legislation is permitted. 

And it distinguished the contrary authority its own precedents seemed to supply. Wilkes County v. Forester, 204 N.C. 163 (1933) contains language that an enabling statute reviving a barred cause of action “cannot be resuscitated”; the court held that passage to be dicta set within a case about title to property, and Jewell v. Price, 264 N.C. 459 (1965) to be a decision about a statute that was not meant to apply retroactively at all. 

The facts, because they show what the window did. Three former East Gaston High School wrestlers were abused by their coach in the mid-1990s and early 2000s; he was convicted in 2014 and sentenced to more than thirty-four years. Their civil claims against the school board had expired no later than 2008. They filed on 2 November 2020, inside the window. Chief Justice Newby wrote; Justice Earls concurred in the result only.

S.L. 2019-245, § 4.2(b) — North Carolina General Assembly, enacted session law 

McKinney v. Goins, No. 109PA22-2 (N.C. 31 Jan. 2025) — full opinion, free