Track

Status

Governing provision

Twenty-five offenses have no limitation — RCW 9A.04.080(1)(a) includes murder, homicide by abuse, arson if a death results, vehicular homicide and, on the sexual side: rape in the first degree and rape in the second degree if the victim is under sixteen; rape of a child in the first, second and third degrees; sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree; custodial sexual misconduct in the first degree; child molestation in the first, second and third degrees; sexual exploitation of a minor; trafficking if the victim is under eighteen; commercial sexual abuse of a minor; promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor; promoting travel for commercial sexual abuse of a minor; and permitting commercial sexual abuse of a minor. Rape in the first, second and third degrees are also unlimited where the perpetrator is a first responder who used that position to facilitate the offense.

BUT RAPE OF A SIXTEEN OR SEVENTEEN YEAR OLD IS TWENTY YEARS — RCW 9A.04.080(1)(b): “Except as provided in (a) of this subsection, the following offenses may not be prosecuted more than 20 years after its commission: (i) Rape in the first degree (RCW 9A.44.040); (ii) Rape in the second degree (RCW 9A.44.050); or (iii) Indecent liberties (RCW 9A.44.100).” The elimination in (a)(vii) and (a)(viii) is expressly limited to victims under sixteen, so a sixteen or seventeen year old falls back to twenty years from the act.

AND INDECENT LIBERTIES IS TWENTY YEARS FOR EVERY VICTIM — indecent liberties under RCW 9A.44.100 appears in subsection (1)(b) without any age qualification and nowhere in the unlimited list. It is a core sexual contact offense and it expires twenty years after the act, with no tolling for the survivor’s minority.

THE WHOLE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE MATERIAL GROUP IS TEN YEARS — RCW 9A.04.080(1)(c)(vi) to (xiii): dealing in depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct in the first and second degrees; possession of such depictions in the first and second degrees; sending or bringing into the state such depictions in the first and second degrees; and viewing such depictions in the first and second degrees. Rape in the third degree is on the same ten-year period, as is trafficking under RCW 9A.40.100 where the victim is eighteen or over.

Incest gets a child-specific rule — RCW 9A.04.080(1)(d): incest under RCW 9A.64.020 may be prosecuted up to ten years after commission or, if committed against a victim under eighteen, up to the victim’s thirtieth birthday, whichever is later.

The residuals — RCW 9A.04.080(1)(j): no other felony more than three years after commission. (1)(k): no gross misdemeanor more than two years. (1)(l): no misdemeanor more than one year. (2): the periods do not run during any time the person charged is not usually and publicly resident within the state.

Why the status is “partly removed”: the elimination of the deadline for rape applies only where the victim was under sixteen; otherwise a twenty-year period applies. And the deadlines are not confined to misdemeanors — indecent liberties, a felony and a mainstream childhood contact offense, expires at twenty years, and every child sexual abuse material offense expires at ten.

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.080 — Washington State Legislature, official RCW

No deadline going forward — RCW 4.16.340(6): “There shall be no time limit for bringing any claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct brought by any person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse when the act of childhood sexual abuse occurs on or after June 6, 2024.”

BUT THE OLD RULE STILL GOVERNS EVERYTHING EARLIER — RCW 4.16.340(1): claims based on childhood sexual abuse “that occurred before June 6, 2024” must be commenced within the later of three years of the act, three years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury was caused by the act, or three years of the time the victim discovered that the act caused the injury for which the claim is brought — “PROVIDED, That the time limit for commencement of an action under this section is tolled for a child until the child reaches the age of eighteen years.”

The three discovery limbs are unusually generous and the legislature said so deliberately. The 1991 finding printed with the section records that the legislature intended to reverse Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wn.2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986), “as well as the line of cases that state that discovery of any injury whatsoever caused by an act of childhood sexual abuse commences the statute of limitations”, and that “the earlier discovery of less serious injuries should not affect the statute of limitations for injuries that are discovered later.”

So a survivor abused before June 2024 is not on a fixed age deadline at all — she is on a three-year clock that restarts on the discovery of each more serious injury. That is a materially different position from the fixed-age states, and it is why Washington’s pre-2024 rule is less restrictive than its bare numbers suggest.

The section covers intentional conduct only — RCW 4.16.340(1) opens “All claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct”. A negligence claim against an institution appears to fall outside it, as it does in South Dakota and, on the authority of Fleming, in Wisconsin. No Washington authority on the point was retrieved, and nothing is asserted.

What counts as childhood sexual abuse — RCW 4.16.340(5): any act against a complainant under eighteen that would have violated chapter 9A.44 RCW or RCW 9.68A.040, or prior laws of similar effect. RCW 4.16.340(2): the victim need not establish which act in a series caused the injury. RCW 4.16.340(3): a custodial parents or guardian’s knowledge is not imputed to a person under eighteen.

Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.340 — Washington State Legislature, official RCW

Section 4.16.340 contains no revival provision. Subsection (6) is keyed to the date of the abuse — “when the act of childhood sexual abuse occurs on or after June 6, 2024” — so it cannot reach a claim arising from earlier conduct, whether or not that claim was still alive.

One historical provision did reach backwards, and it is instructive by contrast. The application note printed with the section records: “Sections 1 and 2 of this act apply to all causes of action commenced on or after June 9, 1988, regardless of when the cause of action may have arisen. To this extent, sections 1 and 2 of this act apply retrospectively.” [1988 c 144 s 3.] That is retroactive application of a discovery rule, not revival of expired claims, and the legislature has not used comparable language since.

The 1989 note is a second example of the legislature legislating about its own earlier intent — it records that the 1989 amendment clarifying tolling to age eighteen “is intended as a clarification of existing law and is not intended to be a change in the law”, and that the 1988 deletion of specific cross-references from RCW 9A.04.080 “did not intend to change the statute of limitations governing those offenses from seven to three years.”

No Washington appellate decision on the constitutionality of retroactive revival was located, and none is asserted. Because no window has ever been enacted, the vested-rights question has not arisen here.

Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.340 — Washington State Legislature, official RCW (subsection (6) and the 1988 application note)