RHODE ISLAND
CHILD SEX ABUSE SOLs
CURRENT CIVIL SOL
In Rhode Island, the civil SOL for all CSA claims against all defendants is age fifty-three with a seven-year discovery rule and revival up to age fifty-three against perpetrators only.
CIVIL SOL SNAPSHOT
AGE CAP |
AGE 53 |
DISCOVERY TOLLING |
7 YEARS |
REVIVAL LAW |
REVIVAL UP TO AGE 53 |
Liability Limitations: Rhode Island is usually not immune from CSA claims,[i] which must be brought against the State within Rhode Island’s SOL for CSA claims.[ii] The State’s liability for damages is generally capped at $100,000.[iii] Charitable immunity is not recognized in Rhode Island.[iv]
Other Tolling Theories/Causes of Action: Rhode Island recognizes that a defendant’s fraudulent concealment of a CSA cause of action can toll the SOL, but it has not been successfully asserted.[v] It also recognizes that equitable estoppel can bar the offending party from asserting an SOL defense when it affirmatively deceived the plaintiff to their detriment.[vi]
Civil SOL History
Age Cap |
|
1993 |
Age 25 (age of majority, 18, plus 7), and age 21 (age of majority, 18, plus 3 years) against other defendants.[vii] |
2019 |
Extended to age 53 (age of majority, 18, plus 35 years) against all defendants.[viii] |
Revival Law |
|
2019 |
Revived claims until a survivor reaches age 53 against perpetrators only.[ix] |
Discovery |
|
Common Law |
In 1991, Rhode Island courts considered applying its common law discovery rule to CSA for the first time.[x] |
Statutory |
In 1991, Rhode Island enacted a statutory discovery rule for CSA claims of 3 years.[xi] In 1993, this was extended to 7 years but applied only to claims against perpetrators and “did not alter” the 3-year rule for claims against non-perpetrators.[xii] The discovery rule is measured by a reasonable diligence standard, meaning courts assess whether a reasonable person in a similar situation to the plaintiff would discover the connection between their injury and their abuse.[xiii] In 2019, Rhode Island expanded its statutory 7-year discovery rule to apply against all types of defendants.[xiv] |
[i] 9 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-20; Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 848 (R.I. 1992) (explaining that when state engages in activity typically performed by private individual, standard of reasonable care is used in negligence analysis, whereas if activity is not typically performed by private person, plaintiff must establish state owed special duty). But see J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 2010) (concluding that social worker was immune from negligence claim arising from placement of minors in foster home where they were sexually abused because a special duty did not exist between social worker and the minors).
[ii] 9 R.I. Gen. Laws §9-1-25(b).
[iii] 9 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-31-2.
[iv] Hodge v. Osteopathic General Hosp., 265 A.2d 733 (R.I. 1970); Basabo v. Salvation Army, 85 A. 120 (R.I. 1912); Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp., 12 R.I. 411 (R.I. 1879).
[v] 9 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-20; Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 182–83 (R.I. 2008) (determining that “[t]he [Plaintiffs] have not pointed to any evidence which would show that any of the instant defendants misled them into believing that the sexual assault did not occur, that [perpetrator] did not in fact commit that assault, or that plaintiffs had suffered no injuries as a result of the assault. In sum, there is no evidence in the record that actual misrepresentations were made by the instant defendants with regard to the [Plaintiffs] potential civil claims.”). See also Kelly v. Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192, 200–01 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding “appellants do not allege that the hierarchy defendants’ silence misled them into believing that the alleged sexual abuse did not occur, that it had not been committed by the priests, or that it had not resulted in injury to plaintiff-appellants. In other words, the hierarchy defendants never concealed from any of the plaintiff-appellants the fact of the injury itself. Rather, the essence of plaintiff-appellants’ fraudulent concealment argument is that the hierarchy defendants’ silence concealed from them an additional theory of liability for the alleged sexual abuse. This argument misses the mark. For a cause of action to accrue, the entire theory of the case need not be immediately apparent. Once injured, a plaintiff is under an affirmative duty to investigate diligently all his potential claims. In this case, as soon as plaintiff-appellants became aware of the alleged abuse, they should also have been aware that the hierarchy defendants, as the priests’ ‘employers,’ were potentially liable for that abuse.”).
[vi] Doe v. Portsmouth Abbey Sch. et al., No. 1:20-cv-00500 (D.R.I Aug. 18, 2021) (denying motion to dismiss on SOL grounds to determine whether Portsmouth Abbey was equitably estopped from asserting an SOL defense due to allegations it knew plaintiff had a case against it that was within the SOL and led her to attorneys who slow walked her case until the SOL expired), https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/37320607/Doe_v_Portsmouth_Abbey_School_et_al.
[vii] 9 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-51 (1993) (SOL) & § 9–1–14(b) (1993) (institutional defendant SOL).
[viii] 9 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-51 (2019) (SOL).
[ix] 9 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-51 (2019) (revival up to age fifty-three); 2019 R.I. Pub. Laws Ch. 19-83 (19-H 5171B).
[x] Doe v. La Brosse, 588 A.2d 605, 605 (R.I. 1991); Doe v. LaBrosse, 625 A.2d 222, 222 (R.I. 1993).
[xi] 9 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-51 (1992); Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873, 876–77 (R.I. 1996); Smith v. O’Connell, 997 F.Supp. 226, 232 (D.R.I. 1998), aff’d sub nom. Kelly v. Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192 (1st Cir. 1999).
[xii] O’Connell, supra note 791, at 231.
[xiii] Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 184 (R.I. 2008).
[xiv] 9 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-51 (2021).
CURRENT RHODE ISLAND CIVIL LAW
tit. 9 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 9-1-51 - Limitation on actions based on sexual abuse or exploitation of a child
(a) (1) All claims or causes of action brought against a perpetrator defendant by any person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of sexual abuse shall be commenced within the later to expire of:
(i) Thirty-five (35) years of the act alleged to have caused the injury or condition; or
(ii) Seven (7) years from the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or condition was caused by the act.
Provided, however, that the time limit or commencement of such an action under this section shall be tolled for a child until the child reaches eighteen (18) years of age. For the purposes of this section, “sexual abuse” shall have the same meaning as in subsection (e) of this section.
(2) All claims or causes of action brought against a non-perpetrator defendant by any person alleging negligent supervision of a person that sexually abused a minor, or that the non-perpetrator defendant’s conduct caused or contributed to the childhood sexual abuse by another person to include, but not be limited to, wrongful conduct, neglect or default in supervision, hiring, employment, training, monitoring, or failure to report and/or the concealment of sexual abuse of a child shall be commenced within the later to expire of:
(i) Thirty-five (35) years of the act or acts alleged to have caused an injury or condition to the minor; or
(ii) Seven (7) years from the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or condition was caused by the act.
Provided, however, that the time limit or commencement of such an action under this section shall be tolled for a child until the child reaches eighteen (18) years of age.
For purposes of this section “sexual abuse” shall have the same meaning as in subsection (e) of this section.
(3) As to a perpetrator defendant, any claim or cause of action based on conduct of sexual abuse may be commenced within the time period enumerated in subsections (a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(ii) regardless if the claim was time-barred under previous version of the general laws.
(4) Except as provided in subsection (a)(3) herein, any claim or cause of action based on conduct of sexual abuse or conduct that caused or contributed to sexual abuse, if the action is not otherwise time-barred under previous version of the general laws on the effective date of this section, may be commenced within the time period enumerated in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section.
(b) The victim need not establish which act in a series of continuing sexual abuse or exploitation incidents cause the injury complained of, but may compute the date of discovery from the date of the last act by the same perpetrator which is part of a common scheme or plan of sexual abuse or exploitation.
(c) The knowledge of a custodial parent or guardian shall not be imputed to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years.
(d) For purposes of this section, “child” means a person under the age of eighteen (18) years.
(e) As used in this section, “sexual abuse” means any act committed by the defendant against a complainant who was less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the act and which act would have been a criminal violation of chapter 37 of title 11.
tit. 9 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 9–1–14 - Limitation of actions for words spoken or personal injuries
(a) Actions for words spoken shall be commenced and sued within one year next after the words spoken, and not after.
(b) Actions for injuries to the person shall be commenced and sued within three (3) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not after, except as provided for otherwise in subsection (c) herein.
Notwithstanding anything herein, any claim based on sexual abuse or exploitation of a child shall be governed by § 9-1-51.
(c) As to an action for personal injuries wherein an injured party is entitled to proceed against an insurer pursuant to § 27-7-2, where an action is otherwise properly filed against an insured within the time limitations provided for by this section, and process against the insured tortfeasor has been returned “non est inventus” and filed with the court, then the statutory limitation for filing an action under § 27-7-2 directly against an insurer shall be extended an additional one hundred twenty (120) days after the expiration of the time limitation provided for in subsection (b) herein.
Case law
CURRENT CRIMINAL SOL
In Rhode Island, there is no criminal SOL for certain CSA felonies and the SOL for trafficking is ten years from the offense. For any remaining felonies and misdemeanors, it is three years from the offense.
CRIMINAL SOL SNAPSHOT
OTHER FELNOIES
RAPE |
NO SOL | tit. 12 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-12-17(a) |
1ST DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT |
NO SOL | tit. 12 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-12-17(a) |
1ST DEGREE CHILD MOLESTATION |
NO SOL | tit. 12 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-12-17(a) |
2ND DEGREE CHILD MOLESTATION |
NO SOL | tit. 12 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-12-17(a) |
BIGAMY |
NO SOL | tit. 12 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-12-17(a) |
OTHER FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS |
3 YEARS FROM OFFENSE | tit. 12 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-12-17(c) |
Tolling: If an indictment has been stolen or destroyed a new indictment may be filed within one year regardless of the SOL.[i]
Criminal SOL History
Age Cap |
|
1985 |
Eliminated for some CSA felonies in 1985.[ii] The SOL for all other felonies and misdemeanors was 3 years from the offense.[iii] |
2017 |
Extended for human trafficking to 10 years after the offense.[iv] |
[i] 12 R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-17.
[ii] 12 R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-17 (1985) (no SOL).
[iii] 12 R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-17 (1985) (no SOL).
[iv] 11 R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-67.1-12 (2017) (SOL for trafficking, forced labor, sexual servitude, and patronizing a minor for commercial sexual activity).
CURRENT RHODE ISLAND LAW
tit. 12 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-12-17 - Statute of limitations
(a) There shall be no statute of limitations for the following offenses: treason against the state; any homicide, arson, first-degree arson, second-degree arson, third-degree arson, burglary, counterfeiting, forgery, robbery, rape, first-degree sexual assault, first-degree child molestation sexual assault, second-degree child molestation sexual assault, bigamy; manufacturing, selling, distribution, or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or distribute, a controlled substance under the Uniform Controlled Substance Act, chapter 28 of title 21; or any other offense for which the maximum penalty provided is life imprisonment.
(b) The statute of limitations for the following offenses shall be ten (10) years: larceny under § 11-41-2 (receiving stolen goods), § 11-41-3 (embezzlement and fraudulent conversion), § 11-41-4 (obtaining property by false pretenses or personation), § 11-41-11 (embezzlement by bank officer or employee), § 11-41-12 (fraudulent conversion by agent or factor), and § 11-41-13 (obtaining signature by false pretenses), or any larceny that is punishable as a felony; any violation of chapter 7 of title 11 (bribery); any violation of § 11-18-1 (giving false document to agent, employee, or public official); perjury; any violation of chapter 42 of title 11 (threats and extortion); any violation of chapter 15 of title 7 (racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations); any violation of chapter 57 of title 11 (racketeer violence); any violation of chapter 36 of title 6 (antitrust law); any violation of § 11-68-2 (exploitation of an elder); any violation of § 11-41-11.1 (unlawful appropriation); any violation of § 11-18-6 (false financial statement to obtain loan or credit); any violation of § 19-9-28 (false statement to obtain a loan); any violation of § 19-9-29 (bank fraud); or any violation of § 11-18-34 (residential mortgage fraud).
(c) The statute of limitations for any other criminal offense shall be three (3) years, unless a longer statute of limitations is otherwise provided for in the general laws.
(d) Any person who participates in any offense, either as a principal accessory or conspirator, shall be subject to the same statute of limitations as if the person had committed the substantive offense.
(e) The statute of limitations for any violation of chapter 18.9 of title 23 (refuse disposal), chapter 19 of title 23 (solid waste management corporation), chapter 19.1 of title 23 (hazardous waste management), chapter 12 of title 46 (water pollution), and chapter 13 of title 46 (public drinking water supply) shall be seven (7) years from the time that the facts constituting the offense or violation shall have become known to law enforcement authorities, unless a longer statute of limitations is otherwise provided for in the general laws.
Case Law
The information provided is solely for informational purposes and is not legal advice. To determine the Rhode Island SOL in a particular case, contact a lawyer in the state.
Last Updated: April 21, 2021