VIRGINIA

CHILD SEX ABUSE SOLs

2024 SOL TRACKER

CURRENT CIVIL SOL

The civil SOL for CSA, trafficking, and some CSAM claims is age 38 with a 20-year discovery rule against all defendants.

CIVIL SOL SNAPSHOT

AGE CAP

CSA: AGE 38

TRAFFICKING: AGE 38

CSAM: AGE 38

REVIVAL LAW

NONE

DISCOVERY TOLLING

20 YEARS

Civil SOL History

*Age Cap*
2002	General personal injury SOL of age 20 (age of majority, 18, plus 2 years), which included CSA, trafficking, and CSAM.^[i]
2011	Extended to age 38 (age of majority, 18, plus 20) for CSA, trafficking, and some CSAM offenses.^[ii]

Revival Law
N/A	No window or other SOL revival law.

*Discovery*
Common Law	No common law discovery rule for CSA.^[iii]
Statutory	In 1991, Virginia added a statutory 2-year discovery rule running from when “the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is first communicated to the person by a licensed physician, psychologist, or clinical psychologist.”[iv] The discovery tolling was capped at age 28 or 10 years after the last act of abuse. In 1995, the age 28 or 10 year limitation was removed from the discovery statute.^[v] In 2011, the State extended the discovery rule to 20 years from discovery. In 2013, it clarified its discovery rule, making clear that the 20-year discovery period runs from when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the abuse is first communicated to the victim by a physician or psychologist.^[vi] The discovery rule applies to claims against all types of defendants. However, it’s retroactivity is limited, and it revives claims only against “natural persons”—meaning perpetrators and other individuals, but not institutional defendants.[vii]

[i] Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-243 (2002) (twenty-year SOL), 8.01-229 (2002) (tolling), 1-204 (2002) (age of majority), 8.01-249(6) (2002) (accrual), 19.2-8 (SOL), 18.2-355 (1997) (trafficking), 18.2-374.1 (1995) (child pornography).

[ii] Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-243 (2011) (twenty-year SOL), 8.01-229 (2011) (tolling), 1-204 (2011) (age of majority), 8.01-249 (2011) (accrual). The age 38 SOL applies to sexual abuse of a child involving direct physical contact. Id. at § 8.01-253(D). The creation of CSAM falls under this definition, but other CSAM offenses, such as distribution or possession, do not. See id. at § 18.2-374.1.

^[iii] Starnes v. Cayouette, 419 S.E.2d 669, 671 (Va. 1992) (determining that “[a] personal injury cause of action ‘shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the date the injury is sustained . . . and not when the resulting damage is discovered.’”) (quoting Va. Code Ann. §8.01-230)), superseded by constitutional amendment as stated in Kerns v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 818 S.E.2d 779 (Va. 2018).

[iv] Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249 (1991); Kopalchick, supra note 1001.

^[v] Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249 (1995).

^[vi] Id. at §§ 8.01-249(6) (2021), § 8.01-243(D) (2021).

[vii] In 2007, the Virginia Supreme Court explained that the discovery rule revival in section 8.01-249 can only constitutionally apply to actions against individual persons and not institutions. Kopalchick, supra note 1001.

CURRENT VIRGINIA CIVIL LAW

Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249 - When cause of action shall be deemed to accrue in certain personal actions

The cause of action in the actions herein listed shall be deemed to accrue as follows:

In actions for fraud or mistake, in actions for violations of the Consumer Protection Act (§ 59.1-196 et seq.) based upon any misrepresentation, deception, or fraud, and in actions for rescission of contract for undue influence, when such fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, deception, or undue influence is discovered or by the exercise of due diligence reasonably should have been discovered;
In actions or other proceedings for money on deposit with a bank or any person or corporation doing a banking business, when a request in writing be made therefor by check, order, or otherwise;
In actions for malicious prosecution or abuse of process, when the relevant criminal or civil action is terminated;
In actions for injury to the person resulting from exposure to asbestos or products containing asbestos, when a diagnosis of asbestosis, interstitial fibrosis, mesothelioma, or other disabling asbestos-related injury or disease is first communicated to the person or his agent by a physician. However, no such action may be brought more than two years after the death of such person;
In actions for contribution or for indemnification, when the contributee or the indemnitee has paid or discharged the obligation. A third-party claim permitted by subsection A of § 8.01-281 and the Rules of Court may be asserted before such cause of action is deemed to accrue hereunder;
In actions for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring during the infancy or incapacity of the person, upon the later of the removal of the disability of infancy or incapacity as provided in § 8.01-229 or when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is first communicated to the person by a licensed physician, psychologist, or clinical psychologist. As used in this subdivision, “sexual abuse” means sexual abuse as defined in subdivision 6 of § 18.2-67.10 and acts constituting rape, sodomy, object sexual penetration or sexual battery as defined in Article 7 (§ 18.2-61 et seq.) of Chapter 4 of Title 18.2;
In products liability actions against parties other than health care providers as defined in § 8.01-581.1 for injury to the person resulting from or arising as a result of the implantation of any prosthetic device for breast augmentation or reconstruction, when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the implantation is first communicated to the person by a physician;
In actions on an open account, from the later of the last payment or last charge for goods or services rendered on the account;
In products liability actions against parties other than health care providers as defined in § 8.01-581.1 for injury to the person resulting from or arising as a result of the implantation of any medical device, when the person knew or should have known of the injury and its causal connection to the deviceWhen cause of action shall be deemed to accrue in certain personal actionsThe cause of action in the actions herein listed shall be deemed to accrue as follows:
1. In actions for fraud or mistake, in actions for violations of the Consumer Protection Act (§ 59.1-196 et seq.) based upon any misrepresentation, deception, or fraud, and in actions for rescission of contract for undue influence, when such fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, deception, or undue influence is discovered or by the exercise of due diligence reasonably should have been discovered;
2. In actions or other proceedings for money on deposit with a bank or any person or corporation doing a banking business, when a request in writing be made therefor by check, order, or otherwise;
3. In actions for malicious prosecution or abuse of process, when the relevant criminal or civil action is terminated;
4. In actions for injury to the person resulting from exposure to asbestos or products containing asbestos, when a diagnosis of asbestosis, interstitial fibrosis, mesothelioma, or other disabling asbestos-related injury or disease is first communicated to the person or his agent by a physician. However, no such action may be brought more than two years after the death of such person;
5. In actions for contribution or for indemnification, when the contributee or the indemnitee has paid or discharged the obligation. A third-party claim permitted by subsection A of § 8.01-281 and the Rules of Court may be asserted before such cause of action is deemed to accrue hereunder;
6. In actions for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring during the infancy or incapacity of the person, upon the later of the removal of the disability of infancy or incapacity as provided in § 8.01-229 or when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is first communicated to the person by a licensed physician, psychologist, or clinical psychologist. As used in this subdivision, “sexual abuse” means sexual abuse as defined in subdivision 6 of § 18.2-67.10 and acts constituting rape, sodomy, object sexual penetration or sexual battery as defined in Article 7 (§ 18.2-61 et seq.) of Chapter 4 of Title 18.2;
7. In products liability actions against parties other than health care providers as defined in § 8.01-581.1 for injury to the person resulting from or arising as a result of the implantation of any prosthetic device for breast augmentation or reconstruction, when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the implantation is first communicated to the person by a physician;
8. In actions on an open account, from the later of the last payment or last charge for goods or services rendered on the account;
9. In products liability actions against parties other than health care providers as defined in § 8.01-581.1 for injury to the person resulting from or arising as a result of the implantation of any medical device, when the person knew or should have known of the injury and its causal connection to the device

Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243 - Personal action for injury to person or property generally; extension in actions for malpractice against health care provider

A. Unless otherwise provided in this section or by other statute, every action for personal injuries, whatever the theory of recovery, and every action for damages resulting from fraud, shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.

B. Every action for injury to property, including actions by a parent or guardian of an infant against a tort-feasor for expenses of curing or attempting to cure such infant from the result of a personal injury or loss of services of such infant, shall be brought within five years after the cause of action accrues. An infant’s claim for medical expenses pursuant to subsection B of § 8.01-36 accruing on or after July 1, 2013, shall be governed by the applicable statute of limitations that applies to the infant’s cause of action.

C. The two-year limitations period specified in subsection A shall be extended in actions for malpractice against a health care provider as follows:

1. In cases arising out of a foreign object having no therapeutic or diagnostic effect being left in a patient’s body, for a period of one year from the date the object is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered;

2. In cases in which fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation prevented discovery of the injury within the two-year period, for one year from the date the injury is discovered or, by the exercise of due diligence, reasonably should have been discovered; and

3. In a claim for the negligent failure to diagnose a malignant tumor, cancer, or an intracranial, intraspinal, or spinal schwannoma, for a period of one year from the date the diagnosis of a malignant tumor, cancer, or an intracranial, intraspinal, or spinal schwannoma is communicated to the patient by a health care provider, provided that the health care provider’s underlying act or omission was on or after July 1, 2008, in the case of a malignant tumor or cancer or on or after July 1, 2016, in the case of an intracranial, intraspinal, or spinal schwannoma. Claims under this section for the negligent failure to diagnose a malignant tumor or cancer, where the health care provider’s underlying act or omission occurred prior to July 1, 2008, shall be governed by the statute of limitations that existed prior to July 1, 2008. Claims under this section for the negligent failure to diagnose an intracranial, intraspinal, or spinal schwannoma, where the health care provider’s underlying act or omission occurred prior to July 1, 2016, shall be governed by the statute of limitations that existed prior to July 1, 2016.

However, the provisions of this subsection shall not apply to extend the limitations period beyond 10 years from the date the cause of action accrues, except that the provisions of subdivision A 2 of § 8.01-229 shall apply to toll the statute of limitations in actions brought by or on behalf of a person under a disability.

D. Every action for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring during the infancy or incapacity of the person as set forth in subdivision 6 of § 8.01-249 shall be brought within 20 years after the cause of action accrues.

D1. For a cause of action accruing on or after July 1, 2020, every action for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse, other than those actions specified in subsection D, shall be brought within 10 years after the cause of action accrues.

D2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections D and D1, every action for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring when the person was 18 years old or older by a person of authority over a victim shall be brought within 15 years after the cause of action accrues. For the purposes of this subsection, “person of authority” means a person in a position of trust having influence over the victim’s life.

E. Every action for injury to property brought by the Commonwealth against a tort-feasor for expenses arising out of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle shall be brought within five years after the cause of action accrues.

Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-229. Suspension or tolling of statute of limitations; effect of disabilities; effect of death; injunction; prevention of service by defendant; dismissal, nonsuit or abatement; devise for payment of debts; new promises; debts proved in creditors' suits

A. Disabilities which toll the statute of limitations.–Except as otherwise specifically provided in §§ 8.01-237, 8.01-241, 8.01-242, 8.01-243, 8.01-243.1 and other provisions of this Code,

1. If a person entitled to bring any action is at the time the cause of action accrues an infant, except if such infant has been emancipated pursuant to Article 15 (§ 16.1-331 et seq.) of Chapter 11 of Title 16.1, or incapacitated, such person may bring it within the prescribed limitation period after such disability is removed; or

2. After a cause of action accrues,

a. If an infant becomes entitled to bring such action, the time during which he is within the age of minority shall not be counted as any part of the period within which the action must be brought except as to any such period during which the infant has been judicially declared emancipated; or

b. If a person entitled to bring such action becomes incapacitated, the time during which he is incapacitated shall not be computed as any part of the period within which the action must be brought, except where a conservator, guardian or committee is appointed for such person in which case an action may be commenced by such conservator, committee or guardian before the expiration of the applicable period of limitation or within one year after his qualification as such, whichever occurs later.

For the purposes of subdivisions 1 and 2, a person shall be deemed incapacitated if he is so adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction, or if it shall otherwise appear to the court or jury determining the issue that such person is or was incapacitated within the prescribed limitation period.

3. If a convict is or becomes entitled to bring an action against his committee, the time during which he is incarcerated shall not be counted as any part of the period within which the action must be brought.

B. Effect of death of a party.–The death of a person entitled to bring an action or of a person against whom an action may be brought shall toll the statute of limitations as follows:

1. Death of person entitled to bring a personal action.–If a person entitled to bring a personal action dies with no such action pending before the expiration of the limitation period for commencement thereof, then an action may be commenced by the decedent’s personal representative before the expiration of the limitation period including the limitation period as provided by subdivision E 3 or within one year after his qualification as personal representative, whichever occurs later.

2. Death of person against whom personal action may be brought.–a. If a person against whom a personal action may be brought dies before the commencement of such action and before the expiration of the limitation period for commencement thereof then a claim may be filed against the decedent’s estate or an action may be commenced against the decedent’s personal representative before the expiration of the applicable limitation period or within one year after the qualification of such personal representative, whichever occurs later.

b. If a person against whom a personal action may be brought dies before suit papers naming such person as defendant have been filed with the court, then such suit papers may be amended to substitute the decedent’s personal representative as party defendant before the expiration of the applicable limitation period or within two years after the date such suit papers were filed with the court, whichever occurs later, and such suit papers shall be taken as properly filed.

3. Effect of death on actions for recovery of realty, or a proceeding for enforcement of certain liens relating to realty.–Upon the death of any person in whose favor or against whom an action for recovery of realty, or a proceeding for enforcement of certain liens relating to realty, may be brought, such right of action shall accrue to or against his successors in interest as provided in Article 2 (§ 8.01-236 et seq.).

4. Accrual of a personal cause of action against the estate of any person subsequent to such person’s death.–If a personal cause of action against a decedent accrues subsequent to his death, an action may be brought against the decedent’s personal representative or a claim thereon may be filed against the estate of such decedent before the expiration of the applicable limitation period or within two years after the qualification of the decedent’s personal representative, whichever occurs later.

5. Accrual of a personal cause of action in favor of decedent.–If a person dies before a personal cause of action which survives would have accrued to him, if he had continued to live, then an action may be commenced by such decedent’s personal representative before the expiration of the applicable limitation period or within one year after the qualification of such personal representative, whichever occurs later.

6. Delayed qualification of personal representative.–If there is an interval of more than two years between the death of any person in whose favor or against whom a cause of action has accrued or shall subsequently accrue and the qualification of such person’s personal representative, such personal representative shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be deemed to have qualified on the last day of such two-year period.

C. Suspension during injunctions.–When the commencement of any action is stayed by injunction, the time of the continuance of the injunction shall not be computed as any part of the period within which the action must be brought.

D. Obstruction of filing by defendant.–When the filing of an action is obstructed by a defendant’s (i) filing a petition in bankruptcy or filing a petition for an extension or arrangement under the United States Bankruptcy Act or (ii) using any other direct or indirect means to obstruct the filing of an action, then the time that such obstruction has continued shall not be counted as any part of the period within which the action must be brought.

E. Dismissal, abatement, or nonsuit.

1. Except as provided in subdivision 3, if any action is commenced within the prescribed limitation period and for any cause abates or is dismissed without determining the merits, the time such action is pending shall not be computed as part of the period within which such action may be brought, and another action may be brought within the remaining period.

2. If a judgment or decree is rendered for the plaintiff in any action commenced within the prescribed limitation period and such judgment or decree is arrested or reversed upon a ground which does not preclude a new action for the same cause, or if there is occasion to bring a new action by reason of the loss or destruction of any of the papers or records in a former action which was commenced within the prescribed limitation period, then a new action may be brought within one year after such arrest or reversal or such loss or destruction, but not after.

3. If a plaintiff suffers a voluntary nonsuit as prescribed in § 8.01-380, the statute of limitations with respect to such action shall be tolled by the commencement of the nonsuited action, regardless of whether the statute of limitations is statutory or contractual, and the plaintiff may recommence his action within six months from the date of the order entered by the court, or within the original period of limitation, or within the limitation period as provided by subdivision B 1, whichever period is longer. This tolling provision shall apply irrespective of whether the action is originally filed in a federal or a state court and recommenced in any other court, and shall apply to all actions irrespective of whether they arise under common law or statute.

F. Effect of devise for payment of debts.–No provision in the will of any testator devising his real estate, or any part thereof, subject to the payment of his debts or charging the same therewith, or containing any other provision for the payment of debts, shall prevent this chapter from operating against such debts, unless it plainly appears to be the testator’s intent that it shall not so operate.

G. Effect of new promise in writing.

1. If any person against whom a right of action has accrued on any contract, other than a judgment or recognizance, promises, by writing signed by him or his agent, payment of money on such contract, the person to whom the right has accrued may maintain an action for the money so promised, within such number of years after such promise as it might be maintained if such promise were the original cause of action. An acknowledgment in writing, from which a promise of payment may be implied, shall be deemed to be such promise within the meaning of this subsection.

2. The plaintiff may sue on the new promise described in subdivision 1 or on the original cause of action, except that when the new promise is of such a nature as to merge the original cause of action then the action shall be only on the new promise.

H. Suspension of limitations in creditors’ suits.–When an action is commenced as a general creditors’ action, or as a general lien creditors’ action, or as an action to enforce a mechanics’ lien, the running of the statute of limitations shall be suspended as to debts provable in such action from the commencement of the action, provided they are brought in before the commissioner in chancery under the first reference for an account of debts; but as to claims not so brought in the statute shall continue to run, without interruption by reason either of the commencement of the action or of the order for an account, until a later order for an account, under which they do come in, or they are asserted by petition or independent action.

In actions not instituted originally either as general creditors’ actions, or as general lien creditors’ actions, but which become such by subsequent proceedings, the statute of limitations shall be suspended by an order of reference for an account of debts or of liens only as to those creditors who come in and prove their claims under the order. As to creditors who come in afterwards by petition or under an order of recommittal, or a later order of reference for an account, the statute shall continue to run without interruption by reason of previous orders until filing of the petition, or until the date of the reference under which they prove their claims, as the case may be.

I. When an action is commenced within a period of 30 days prior to the expiration of the limitation period for commencement thereof and the defending party or parties desire to institute an action as third-party plaintiff against one or more persons not party to the original action, the running of the period of limitation against such action shall be suspended as to such new party for a period of 60 days from the expiration of the applicable limitation period.

J. If any award of compensation by the Workers’ Compensation Commission pursuant to Chapter 5 (§ 65.2-500 et seq.) of Title 65.2 is subsequently found void ab initio, other than an award voided for fraudulent procurement of the award by the claimant, the statute of limitations applicable to any civil action upon the same claim or cause of action in a court of this Commonwealth shall be tolled for that period of time during which compensation payments were made.

K. Suspension of limitations during criminal proceedings.–In any personal action for damages, if a criminal prosecution arising out of the same facts is commenced, the time such prosecution is pending shall not be computed as part of the period within which such a civil action may be brought. For purposes of this subsection, the time during which a prosecution is pending shall be calculated from the date of the issuance of a warrant, summons or capias, the return or filing of an indictment or information, or the defendant’s first appearance in any court as an accused in such a prosecution, whichever date occurs first, until the date of the final judgment or order in the trial court, the date of the final disposition of any direct appeal in state court, or the date on which the time for noting an appeal has expired, whichever date occurs last. Thereafter, the civil action may be brought within the remaining period of the statute or within one year, whichever is longer.

If a criminal prosecution is commenced and a grand jury indictment is returned or a grand jury indictment is waived after the period within which a civil action arising out of the same set of facts may be brought, a civil action may be brought within one year of the date of the final judgment or order in the trial court, the date of the final disposition of any direct appeal in state court, or the date on which the time for noting an appeal has expired, whichever date occurs last, but no more than 10 years after the date of the crime or two years after the cause of action shall have accrued under § 8.01-249, whichever date occurs last.

Va. Code Ann. § 1-204 - Age of majority

For the purposes of all laws of the Commonwealth including common law, case law, and the acts of the General Assembly, unless an exception is specifically provided in this Code, a person shall be an adult, shall be of full age, and shall reach the age of majority when he becomes 18 years of age.

Case law

Kopalchick v. Catholic Diocese of Richmond, 645 S.E.2d 439, 442 (Va. 2007): Explaining that the discovery rule in § 8.01-249 only applies to actions against individual persons and not institutions.

CURRENT CRIMINAL SOL

CSA: There is no criminal SOL for any felonies, including CSA. The SOL for misdemeanors is age 23 or age 19, depending on the age difference between the victim and the offender.

Trafficking: There is no SOL for trafficking felonies.

CSAM: There is no SOL for CSAM felonies.

CRIMINAL SOL SNAPSHOT

CSA	NO SOL
TRAFFICKING	NO SOL
CSAM	NO SOL

Criminal SOL History

*Age Cap*
2002	No criminal SOL for any felonies, including CSA, CSAM, and trafficking, and for misdemeanors the SOL was 1 year from the offense.^[i]
2016	Extended the SOL for misdemeanors to age 19 (age of majority, 18, plus 1 year).^[ii]
2020	Extended the SOL from age 19 to age 23 (age of majority + 5 years) for misdemeanor CSA by adults more than 3 years older than the victim .^[iii]

[i] Anderson v. Commonwealth, 634 S.E.2d 372, 375 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (holding, “[c]onsistent with the common law, Virginia has no general SOL on felonies.”).

[ii] Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-8 (2016) (SOL).

[iii] Id. (2020) (SOL).

CURRENT VIRGINIA CRIMINAL LAW

Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-8 - Limitation of prosecutions

A prosecution for a misdemeanor, or any pecuniary fine, forfeiture, penalty or amercement, shall be commenced within one year next after there was cause therefor, except that a prosecution for petit larceny may be commenced within five years, and for an attempt to produce abortion, within two years after commission of the offense.

A prosecution for any misdemeanor violation of § 54.1-3904 shall be commenced within two years of the discovery of the offense.

A prosecution for violation of laws governing the placement of children for adoption without a license pursuant to § 63.2-1701 shall be commenced within one year from the date of the filing of the petition for adoption.

A prosecution for making a false statement or representation of a material fact knowing it to be false or knowingly failing to disclose a material fact, to obtain or increase any benefit or other payment under the Virginia Unemployment Compensation Act (§ 60.2-100 et seq.) shall be commenced within three years next after the commission of the offense.

A prosecution for any violation of § 10.1-1320, 62.1-44.32 (b), 62.1-194.1, or Article 11 (§ 62.1-44.34:14 et seq.) of Chapter 3.1 of Title 62.1 that involves the discharge, dumping or emission of any toxic substance as defined in § 32.1-239 shall be commenced within three years next after the commission of the offense.

Prosecution of Building Code violations under § 36-106 shall commence within one year of discovery of the offense by the building official, provided that such discovery occurs within two years of the date of initial occupancy or use after construction of the building or structure, or the issuance of a certificate of use and occupancy for the building or structure, whichever is later. However, prosecutions under § 36-106 relating to the maintenance of existing buildings or structures as contained in the Uniform Statewide Building Code shall commence within one year of the issuance of a notice of violation for the offense by the building official.

Prosecution of any misdemeanor violation of § 54.1-111 shall commence within one year of the discovery of the offense by the complainant, but in no case later than five years from occurrence of the offense.

Prosecution of any misdemeanor violation of any professional licensure requirement imposed by a locality shall commence within one year of the discovery of the offense by the complainant, but in no case later than five years from occurrence of the offense.

Prosecution of nonfelonious offenses which constitute malfeasance in office shall commence within two years next after the commission of the offense.

Prosecution for a violation for which a penalty is provided for by § 55.1-1989 shall commence within three years next after the commission of the offense.

Prosecution of illegal sales or purchases of wild birds, wild animals and freshwater fish under § 29.1-553 shall commence within three years after commission of the offense.

Prosecution of violations under Title 58.1 for offenses involving false or fraudulent statements, documents or returns, or for the offense of willfully attempting in any manner to evade or defeat any tax or the payment thereof, or for the offense of willfully failing to pay any tax, or willfully failing to make any return at the time or times required by law or regulations shall commence within three years next after the commission of the offense, unless a longer period is otherwise prescribed.

Prosecution of violations of subsection A or B of § 3.2-6570 shall commence within five years of the commission of the offense, except violations regarding agricultural animals shall commence within one year of the commission of the offense.

A prosecution for a violation of § 18.2-386.1 shall be commenced within five years of the commission of the offense.

A prosecution for any violation of the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, Chapter 9.3 (§ 24.2-945 et seq.) of Title 24.2, shall commence within one year of the discovery of the offense but in no case more than three years after the date of the commission of the offense.

A prosecution of a crime that is punishable as a misdemeanor pursuant to the Virginia Computer Crimes Act (§ 18.2-152.1 et seq.) or pursuant to § 18.2-186.3 for identity theft shall be commenced before the earlier of (i) five years after the commission of the last act in the course of conduct constituting a violation of the article or (ii) one year after the existence of the illegal act and the identity of the offender are discovered by the Commonwealth, by the owner, or by anyone else who is damaged by such violation.

A prosecution of a misdemeanor under § 18.2-64.2, 18.2-67.4, 18.2-67.4:1, 18.2-67.4:2, 18.2-67.5, or 18.2-370.6 or clause (ii) of § 18.2-371 where the victim is a minor at the time of the offense shall be commenced no later than one year after the victim reaches majority, unless the alleged offender of such offense was an adult and more than three years older than the victim at the time of the offense, in which instance such prosecution shall be commenced no later than five years after the victim reaches majority.

A prosecution for a violation of § 18.2-260.1 shall be commenced within three years of the commission of the offense.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to any person fleeing from justice or concealing himself within or without the Commonwealth to avoid arrest or be construed to limit the time within which any prosecution may be commenced for desertion of a spouse or child or for neglect or refusal or failure to provide for the support and maintenance of a spouse or child.

Case Law

Anderson v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 704, 711, 634 S.E.2d 372, 375 (2006): (We note that, ‘[c]onsistent with the common law, Virginia has no general statute of limitation on felonies.’)

The information provided is solely for informational purposes and is not legal advice. To determine the Virginia SOL in a particular case, contact a lawyer in the state.

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Last Updated: November 15, 2023