WEST VIRGINIA

Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought: (a) Within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, if it be for damage to property; (b) within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries; and (c) within one year next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for any other matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it could not have been brought at common law by or against his personal representative.

(a) After a civil action is commenced, the running of any statute of limitation is tolled for, and only for, the pendency of that civil action as to any claim that has been or may be asserted in the civil action by counterclaim, whether compulsory or permissive, or cross-claim : Provided, That if a permissive counterclaim would be barred but for the provisions of this section, the permissive counterclaim may be asserted only in the action tolling the statute of limitations under this section. This section shall be deemed to toll the running of any statute of limitation with respect to any claim for which the statute of limitation has not expired on the effective date of this section, but only for so long as the action tolling the statute of limitations is pending.

(b) Any defendant who desires to file a third-party complaint shall have one hundred eighty days from the date of service of process of the original complaint, or the time remaining on the applicable statute of limitations, whichever is longer, to bring any third-party complaint against any non-party person or entity: Provided, That any new party brought into litigation by a third-party complaint shall be afforded, from the date of service of process of the third-party complaint, an additional 180-day period, or the remaining statute of limitations period, whichever is longer, to file any third-party complaint of its own, and any applicable statute of limitation shall be tolled during this time period.

(c) For purposes of this section, the term “third-party complaint” means a claim brought by a defendant against any person or entity that was not originally a party to the underlying civil action, where the new claim is made a part of the underlying civil action.

(d) This section tolls the running of any statute of limitation with respect to any claim for which the statute of limitation has not expired on the effective date of this section, but only for so long as the action tolling the statute of limitations is pending. This section does not limit the ability of a court to use the doctrine of equitable tolling or the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations in any action, including any third-party complaint that would otherwise be subject to subsection (b) of this section.

On and after June nine, one thousand nine hundred seventy-two, except as otherwise specifically provided in this code, no person who is eighteen years of age or older shall lack legal capacity, by reason of his age, to enter into contracts, sell or purchase real or personal property, create a lien, execute any legal or other written instrument, prosecute or defend legal actions, assert claims or deal in his own affairs in any manner whatsoever.

The provisions of this section, and the provisions of chapter sixty-one, acts of the Legislature, regular session, one thousand nine hundred seventy-two, reducing various prescribed age requirements to eighteen years of age, shall not, however, by operation of law affect any rights, duties, obligations or interests accruing or vesting by virtue of any statute, act, event, transaction, order, judgment or decree prior to June nine, one thousand nine hundred seventy-two, or any cause of action which arose or any civil action or claim instituted or asserted prior to such date, and any such right, duty, obligation, interest, cause of action, civil action or claim may be enforced, exercised, enjoyed, terminated, discharged, consummated, prosecuted, maintained or asserted with like effect as if said chapter sixty-one had not been enacted: Provided, That any person who has attained the age of eighteen years shall have full power and authority to exercise any and all of the rights, privileges and powers granted to him in the first paragraph of this section with respect to any legal or equitable interest acquired by or which vested in such person before he became eighteen years of age: Provided, however, That under no circumstances whatever shall any of the changes made by said chapter sixty-one have any effect upon any of the terms or provisions of or any conditions imposed by any last will and testament, trust agreement or any other written instrument of any kind or character executed prior to such date of June nine, one thousand nine hundred seventy-two: Provided further, That any order or mandate providing for payment of child support for any person up to the age of twenty-one years contained in any decree or order of divorce or separate maintenance or in any order in any nonsupport or bastardy proceeding, which decree or order was entered prior to June nine, one thousand nine hundred seventy-two, may by order of the court be terminated as to such person upon such person attaining the age of eighteen years. Moreover, the provisions of this section shall not affect any acts performed or transactions entered into by a person under the age of twenty-one years prior to June nine, one thousand nine hundred seventy-two. No change in the general age of legal capacity or in the definitions of the words “under disability,” “infant” or “minor” contained in section ten, article two of this chapter shall alter any statute of limitations as to causes of action arising before such date of June nine, one thousand nine hundred seventy-two.

Wilmink v. Kanawha Cty. Bd. of Educ., 214 F.App’x 294, 296 (4th Cir. 2007)

Dunn v. Rockwell, 689 S.E.2d 255, 264 (W. Va. 2009): Application of discovery rule does not require a showing by the plaintiff that some action by the defendant prevented the plaintiff from knowing of the wrong at the time of the injury

Merrill v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 632 S.E.2d 307 (W. Va. 2006) and Miller v. Monongalia County Bd. of Educ., 219 W.Va. 151 (W. Va. 2009). Some West Virginia courts have applied this 20-year from injury cap to limit the discovery rule, while others have not.